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EQUITABLE TOLLING OF TITLE VII TIME LIMITS IN
ACTIONS AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT
I
INTRODUCTION
In 1964, Congress passed Title VII of the Civil Rights Act'
which granted employees of certain organizations a private cause of
action against their employers. Title VII sought to secure equal
opportunity in employment regardless of race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin. 2 Although it protected civilian employees, the
1964 Act failed to expressly protect federal employees.3 Instead,
Congress empowered the Civil Service Commissioner to establish
procedures to monitor and adjudicate federal employees' employ-
ment discrimination complaints. 4 These procedures, however,
failed to eliminate employment discrimination within the federal
government.
5
1 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 253-66 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982)). This note will refer to this statute
and its subsequent amendments as "the statute" or "Title VII."
2 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) ("It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an em-
ployer (1) to ... discriminate ... because of... race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin ......
3 Id.
4 H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 25, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 2137, 2157.
5 The House Bill was passed in lieu of the Senate bill. The House Committee
stated: "There is serious doubt that court review is available to the aggrieved Federal
employee. Monetary restitution or back pay is not attainable. In promotion situations, a
critical area of discrimination, the promotion is often no longer available." H.R. REP.
No. 238, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 25, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
2137, 2160. Similarly, the Senate Report stated:
The testimony before the Labor Subcommittee reflected a general lack of
confidence in the effectiveness of the complaint procedure on the part of
Federal employees.... This [had], in turn, discouraged persons from
filing complaints with the [Civil Service] Commission for fear that doing
so [would] only result in antagonizing their supervisors and impairing
any future hope of advancement.
S. REP. No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 14.
The testimony of the Civil Service Commission notwithstanding, the
committee found that an aggrieved Federal employee does not have ac-
cess to the courts. In many cases, the employee must overcome a U,S.
Government defense of sovereign immunity or failure to exhaust admin-
istrative remedies with no certainty as to the steps required to exhaust
such remedies. Moreover, the remedial authority of the Commission and
the courts has also been in doubt.
Id. at 16. See generally Hearings on H.R. 1746 Before the General Subcomm. on Labor of the
House Comm. on Education and Labor, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 320, 322, 385-86, 391-92
(1971); Hearings on S. 2515 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and
Public Welfare, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 296, 301, 308, 318 (1971).
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To remedy these problems, Congress amended the Civil Rights
Act in 1972.6 The 1972 amendments transferred equal opportunity
enforcement powers from the Civil Service Commission to the
Equal Opportunity Employment Commission. 7 Moreover, the
amendments granted federal employees a private cause of action for
their employment discrimination claims against the federal govern-
ment.8 Although the amendments ameliorated many problems that
existed in the 1964 version of the Civil Rights Act, one problem
remained: are Title VII's time limits jurisdictional prerequisites to
suit against the federal government, or statutes of limitations sub-
ject to equitable principles such as waiver, estoppel, or tolling?9
This note seeks to formulate a framework whereby courts can




A. Equitable Estoppel of the United States
To see why a court's equitable assumption of jurisdiction over
Title VII claims against the United States presents a problem, one
must first understand the nature of the federal government's sover-
eign immunity. Absent an express statutory waiver, sovereign im-
munity prevents a federal court from exercising subject matter
jurisdiction over suits against the United States. 10 Moreover, in
those cases where Congress has waived the sovereign immunity of
6 Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103
(1972) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982)).
7 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(4) (historical note). The Equal Opportunity Employment
Commission will be referred to in this note as the "EEOC."
8 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c).
9 The Circuit Courts have split on this issue. See, e.g., Stuckett v. United States
Postal Serv., 469 U.S. 898, 899 (1984) (White, J. and Rehnquist, J., dissenting from the
denial of certiorari) ("Because the complaint was dismissed for [lack of subject matter
jurisdiction], the question of the jurisdictional significance of the 30-day limit is squarely
presented. In light of the conflict among the circuit courts, I would grant certiorari.").
10 United States v. Shaw, 309 U.S. 495, 500-01 (1940) ("[W]ithout specific statutory
consent, no suit may be brought against the United States.") See generally C. WRIGHT, A.
MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE JURISDICTION AND RELATED
MATTERS § 3654, at 186-92 (1985 & Supp. 1988) stating:
The absence of [sovereign] consent [to be sued] is a fundamental juris-
dictional defect that may be asserted at any time, either by the parties or
by the court on its own motion. Only Congress can waive the United
States' sovereign immunity and the government is not subject to asser-
tions of waiver or estoppel when it raises the defense.
Id.; Note, Limitations Periods Under Title VII: Has Time Run Out on the Sovereign Immunity
Doctrine?, 63 B.U.L. REV. 1157, 1157-58 nn.7-8 (1983) (authored by Lisa Naparstek
Green) (arguing that courts are powerless to eliminate the sovereign immunity doctrine
applied to Title VII time limits for filing in federal court).
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the United States, the terms of the waiver statute, including time
limits, define the parameters of the federal court's jurisdiction."
x
Additionally, the common law compels courts to construe these pa-
rameters strictly in favor of the United States. 12 Thus, unless the
waiver statute expressly provides for equitable estoppel or waiver,
courts theoretically lack the power to apply these doctrines in ac-
tions against the federal government and must therefore decline
subject matter jurisdiction. 13
The 1972 Amendments to Title VII allow individuals to sue the
federal government. Thus, they constitute a waiver of federal sover-
eign immunity which courts must strictly construe. Title VII no-
where provides for federal courts to employ equitable principles
such as waiver, tolling, or estoppel to assume jurisdiction over un-
timely claims against the United States. Thus, all other things equal,
courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to hear untimely Title VII
claims.14
11 See Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 160 (1981)("the United States as Sover-
eign, 'is immune from suit save as it consents to be sued.., and the terms of its consent
to be sued in any court define that court's jurisdiction to entertain the suit.' ") (quoting
United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1975) (quoting United States v. Sherwood,
312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941)). See also Untied States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980).
12 453 U.S. at 160-61 (strict construction of age discrimination act) ("[B]ecause of
the power of the sovereign to attach conditions to its consent to be sued... Congress,
despite the Seventh Amendment, may dispense with jury trial in suits brought in the
Court of Claims.") (quoting United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941); Sori-
ano v. United States, 352 U.S. 270, 276 (1957) (not allowing equitable tolling); United
States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 590 (1941) (strict construction of Tucker Act); but see
United States v. Yellow Cab, 340 U.S. 543, 550 (1951) (under FTCA, the court recog-
nized a trend toward increased scope of waiver by federal government of its sovereign
immunity); Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 51 (1949) (courts should not apply
automatic axioms of construction to Federal Tort Claims Act); Canadian Aviator, Ltd. v.
United States, 324 U.S. 215, 222 (1945) (Public Vessels Act broadly construed).
13 See Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. 785, 788 (1981) (courts consistently have re-
fused to estop the government where an eligible applicant lost benefits because of erro-
neous replies to oral inquiries); Federal Crop Ins. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 385 (1947)
(the terms and conditions for creating liability on the part of the government define the
parameters of sovereign immunity, regardless of reliance on governmental agent's mis-
statement); Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389, 409 (1917) ("(I]t is
enough to say that the United States is neither bound nor estopped by acts of its officers
or agents in entering into an arrangement or agreement to do or cause to be done what
the law does not sanction or permit.").
The sovereign immunity doctrine results from the belief that those suing the gov-
ernment should not have access to the public treasury without the sovereign's consent.
For a thorough treatment of sovereign immunity, see Note, Schweiker v. Hansen: Equita-
ble Estoppel Against the Government, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 609, 610-11 (1982) (authored by
Deborah H. Eisen) ("The government's immunity from equitable estoppel derives from
the concept of sovereign immunity. Courts feared that applying equitable estoppel
against the government would interfere with policymaking and other necessary govern-
ment functions.") (footnotes omitted); Note, Equitable Estoppel of the Government, 79
COLUM. L. REV. 551 (1979)(authored by David K. Thompson).
14 See supra text accompanying note 10.
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B. Statutes and Regulations Applicable to Federal Title VII
Actions
Under Title VII, Congress prohibited discriminatory practices
affecting employees or applicants for employment of the federal
government, 15 vested enforcement power with the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC")16 and provided a means
for federal employees to appeal final agency actions in a federal dis-
trict court.' 7 This portion of Title VII constitutes the specific con-
gressional waiver of the sovereign immunity of the United States.
Pursuant to its statutory authority, the EEOC established proce-
dures designed to ensure equal opportunity in federal governmental
employment.' Under these procedures, each agency head must es-
tablish an equal opportunity program,' 9 and must also provide
equal opportunity counselors and informal adjudication procedures
for resolution of discrimination complaints.
20
The EEOC also established time limits governing prosecutions
of Title VII employment discrimination complaints. 21 Under these
procedures, an agency may accept a discrimination complaint only
when "[t]he complainant brought to the attention of the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Counselor [within the offending agency] the
matter causing him/her to believe he/she had been discriminated
against within 30 calendar days of the allegedly discriminatory
15 The statute provides as follows: "All personnel actions affecting employees or
applicants for employment ... shall be made free from any discrimination based on race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a).
16 The statute states, "Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission shall have authority to enforce the provisions of
subsection (a) .... 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(b).
17 The statute requires:
Within thirty days of receipt of notice of final action taken by a depart-
ment, agency, or unit referred to in subsection (a) of this section, or by
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission upon an appeal from a
decision or order of such department, agency, or unit on a complaint of
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex or national origin,
brought pursuant to subsection (a) of this section.... or after one hun-
dred and eighty days from the filing of the initial charge with the depart-
ment, agency, or unit or with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission on appeal from a decision or order of such department,
agency, or unit, an employee or applicant for employment, if aggrieved
by the final disposition of his complaint, or by the failure to take final
action on his complaint, may file a civil action as provided in section
2000e-5 of this title, in which civil action the head of the department,
agency, or unit, as appropriate, shall be the defendant.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c).
18 29 C.F.R. § 1613 (1988).
19 29 C.F.R. § 1613.203.
20 29 C.F.R. § 1613.204(d)(4).
21 29 C.F.R. § 1613.214(a)(I)(i).
202 [Vol. 74:199
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event. .... -22 The regulation provides for extension of the thirty-
day limitation for circumstances beyond the complainant's control
or for other reasons considered sufficient by the agency.
23
If an agency-designated EEO Counselor fails to satisfactorial
dispose of the federal employee's complaint through informal adju-
dication within twenty-one calendar days, the agency must send the
employee written notice of his24 right to file a formal complaint with
the appropriate agency official within fifteen calendar days of receipt
of the notice.25 If the employee remains dissatisfied after the offi-
cial's decision, he has twenty calendar days after receipt of the
agency's notice of final decision to appeal to the EEOC.2 6 It is im-
portant to note that, until the EEOC receives the plaintiff's appeal,
all action occurs within the allegedly offending agency. Within this
forum the opportunity for coercion is great.
When the EEOC makes a final determination on a complaint, it
notifies the aggrieved employee of his right to file a civil action pur-
suant to Title VII. Upon receipt of this "right to sue" letter, the
employee has thirty days to file a civil action in a federal district
court.2
7
C. Circuit Court Treatment of Equitable Tolling of Tide VII
Time Limits Against the Federal Government
As this note has discussed, unless expressly provided for, sover-
eign immunity should completely bar federal courts' subject matter
jurisdiction over a Title VII claim against the United States where
the plaintiff has missed one of the aforementioned time limits.2
8
Therefore, unless Congress somewhere provided for equitable es-
toppel, waiver, or tolling, courts lack the power to invoke these doc-
trines to assume jurisdiction in Title VII actions against the federal
government.29
Circuit Courts disagree over whether to invoke such principles
to assume jurisdiction over untimely Title VII actions against the
22 Id
23 29 G.F.R. § 1613.214(a)(4) states:
The Agency shall extend the time limits in this section when the com-
plainant shows that he/she was not notified of the time limits and was not
otherwise aware of them, was prevented by circumstances beyond the
complainant's control from submitting the matter within the time limits;
or for other reasons considered sufficient by the agency.
Id.
24 This note is gender neutral. The pronoun he is used for simplicity.
25 29 G.F.R. § 1613.213(a).
26 29 C.F.R. § 1613.233(a).
27 29 C.F.R. § 1613.282.
28 See supra text accompanying note 10.
29 See supra text accompanying notes 9-13.
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government.3 0 Three basic approaches to this problem exist. First,
some circuit courts accept jurisdiction over all untimely Title VII
claims upon a sufficient equitable showing.-3 This note will refer to
this approach as the "liberal standard." 32
Second, one circuit declines jurisdiction over almost all un-
timely Tide VII cases. 33 Under this approach, if the plaintiff misses
a time limit applicable while the complaint was still within the alleg-
edly offending agency, the plaintiff must show that one of the regu-
latory exception provisions applies; if the plaintiff misses the
statutory thirty-day time limit, he must show affirmative governmen-
tal misconduct before the court will accept jurisdiction over an un-
timely claim. 34 This note refers to this approach as the "strict
standard."3
5
Third, other circuits accept jurisdiction over untimely Title VII
complaints so long as the plaintiff missed the time limit while the
complaint was still within the offending agency. These circuits,
however, consider time limits applicable after the complaint leaves
the allegedly offending agency, especially the statutory thirty-day
limit, as jurisdictional prerequisites to suit.36 This note refers to this
approach as the "intermediate standard."37
1. The Liberal Standard
Upon an adequate equitable showing by the plaintiff, courts ap-
plying the liberal standard accept jurisdiction over untimely Title
VII claims against the federal government, regardless of the stage of
the proceedings, or whether the time limit is statutory or agency
promulgated. 3  Courts applying this standard reject the jurisdic-
30 See case cited supra note 9.
31 These include the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Tenth, Eleventh, and District of Colum-
bia Circuits. See, e.g., Hornsby v. United States Postal Serv., 787 F.2d 87 (3d Cir. 1986);
Aronberg v. Walters, 755 F.2d 1114 (4th Cir. 1985); Martinez v. Orr, 738 F.2d 1107
(10th Cir. 1984); Milam v. United States Postal Serv., 674 F.2d 860 (lth Cir. 1982);
Parks v. Dunlop, 517 F.2d 785 (5th Cir. 1975); Saltz v. Lehman, 672 F.2d 207 (D.C. Cir.
1972).
32 See infra text accompanying notes 38-46.
33 This is the Seventh Circuit. See, e.g., Sims v. Heckler, 725 F.2d 1143 (7th Cir.
1984).
34 See infra text accompanying notes 46-67.
35 See infra text accompanying notes 46-90.
36 These include the Eighth and Ninth Circuits. See, e.g., Cooper v. United States
Postal Serv., 740 F.2d 714 (9th Cir. 1984); Scott v. St. Paul Postal Serv., 720 F.2d 524
(8th Cir. 1983) (per curiam), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1083 (1984).
37 See infra text accompanying notes 91-98.
38 See, e.g., Martinez v. Orr, 738 F.2d 1107 (10th Cir. 1984) (holding that equitable
considerations require tolling the thirty-day limit for federal plaintiff to bring cause of
action in federal district court); Milam v. United States Postal Serv., 674 F.2d 860 (11 th
Cir. 1982) (timely filing in federal district court is not ajurisdictional prerequisite to suit
in a Title VII action against the government); Saltz v. Lehman, 672 F.2d 207 (D.C. Cir.
204 [Vol. 74:199
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tional label for Title VII time limits outright and subject all such
time limits to equitable tolling or waiver.3 9
These courts justify the liberal standard by assuming that Zipes
v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.40 resolves whether a federal court may
assume jurisdiction over an untimely Title VII claim both in federal
and private Title VII actions. In Zipes, a union sued TWA, a private
employer, for sex discrimination in violation of Title VII. 4 1 The
Seventh Circuit barred most of the claims for claimants' failure to
file timely charges with the EEOC. 42 The Seventh Circuit held that,
although the plaintiffs had legitimate claims, lack of timely filing de-
prived the district court of subject matter jurisdiction to hear the
claims. Moreover, the time limits were not subject to tolling or
waiver such as to allow the court to obtain jurisdiction.
43
In reversing, the Supreme Court held that timely filing "is not a
jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in federal court, but.., like a stat-
ute of limitations, is subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable toll-
ing."44 The Court reasoned, "a technical reading [of Title VII
statutes] would be 'particularly inappropriate in a statutory scheme
in which laymen, unassisted by trained lawyers, initiate the
process.' -45
Despite the Supreme Court's apparent acceptance of equitable
creation of jurisdiction in Title VII actions, Zipes involved a dispute
between private litigants. Between a private and federal litigant,
sovereign immunity renders resolution of the jurisdictional issue
more complex. The Court has not yet expressly addressed the
cicumstances under which a court may assume jurisdiction over an
untimely Tide VII claim against the federal government.46
1982) (holding that plaintiff can show equitable reasons for failure to file on time in
federal district court).
39 See, e.g., 738 F.2d at 1110 ("In view of the principle that Title VII 'is a remedial
statute to be liberally construed in favor of victims of discrimination,' we conclude that
the thirty-day limitation of section 2000e-16(c) is not jurisdictional and may be subject
to equitable tolling in appropriate cases.") (quoting Davis v. Valley Dist. Co., 522 F.2d
827, 832 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1090 (1977)).
40 455 U.S. 385 (1982).
41 Id. at 388. The airline grounded all female flight attendants who became
mothers even though their male counterparts who became fathers continued flying.
42 Id. at 389-90.
43 Id. at 392-93.
44 Id at 393. The Court also stated:
By holding compliance with the filing period to be not a jurisdictional
prerequisite to filing a Title VII suit, but a requirement subject to waiver
as well as tolling when equity so requires, we honor the remedial purpose
of the legislation as a whole without negating the particular purpose of
the filing requirement, to give prompt notice to the employer.
Id. at 398.
45 Id- at 397 (quoting Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522, 527 (1972)).
46 See case cited supra note 9.
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2. The Strict Standard
Courts that apply the strict standard generally refuse to accept
jurisdiction over untimely Title VII claims.47 Under this standard,
the court will only assume such jurisdiction in one of two circum-
stances: first, if the employee misses an agency-promulgated time
limit, he must show that one of the exceptions enumerated in 29
C.F.R. § 1613.214(a)(4) applies; 48 second, if the employee misses
the statutory thirty-day time limit for filing in district court, he must
demonstrate affirmative governmental misconduct.49
In Sims v. Heckler,50 the Seventh Circuit explained its view that
all Title VII time limits, whether promulgated by statute or by an
agency pursuant to the statute, are jurisdictional. In Wolfolk v. Ri-
vera5 1 the Seventh Circuit explained when a court should apply the
agency promulgated exceptions enumerated in 29 C.F.R. section
1613.214(a)(4) to agency time limits.
Sims involved a black Department of Health and Human Serv-
ices (HHS) employee. In December 1976, Sims complained to his
EEO Counselor that HHS had engaged in racial discrimination
against him.52 Sims' complaint came eight months after the time
limit for filing with the EEOC had expired.53 On February 9, 1977,
Sims and his EEO counsellor abandoned their attempts to infor-
mally resolve Sims' complaint, after which Sims formally filed with
the HHS. 54 During the next five years, "dispositions were pro-
posed, settlements were suggested, a hearing was held, and an ex-
tensive report was filed," 55 after which HHS finally dismissed Sims'
complaint. 56 Nevertheless, while his administrative claim was pend-
ing, Sims filed a Title VII action against the agency in federal district
47 See Sims v. Heckler, 725 F.2d 1143, 1146 (7th Cir. 1984) ("only an act which
amounts to 'affirmative misconduct' can estop the government from asserting a
defense").
48 See supra text accompanying note 26.
49 See, e.g., Sims, 725 F.2d at 1146.
50 725 F.2d 1143 (7th Cir. 1984).
51 729 F.2d 1114 (7th Cir. 1984).
52 725 F.2d at 1144. Sims' problems began in March 1975 when the Department of
Health and Human Services, citing inadequate job performance, denied Sims a semi-
automatic seniority promotion. Sims claimed that the denial was racially motivated.
The court noted that, "the promotion denial soured Mr. Sims' attitude toward both his
job and supervisors [leading] to incidents which further damaged Mr. Sims' prospects
for advancement." Id.
53 Id. (thirty-day time limit for filing complaint under 29 C.F.R. § 1613.214(a)(1)(i)
expired because the complaint was filed in December and the event occurred in March).
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Id. Sims filed suit in December 1976. The agency dismissed his complaint in
May 1982.
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court pursuant to section 2000e-16(c).57 The court dismissed for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the grounds that Sims had
failed to comply with administrative prerequisites to suit, thus ren-
dering the court powerless to entertain his suit.58
On appeal, Sims advanced two arguments. First, Sims sought
refuge in section 1613.214(a)(4)'s exceptions to the thirty-day dead-
line within which he had to notify the EEO counsellor. 59 In re-
jecting this portion of Sims' claim, the Seventh Circuit held that
Sims had given the agency insufficient time to determine whether
the agency promulgated exception provisions applied because he
had not completed the agency action before suing in federal court.
60
Next, Sims argued that, even if he had failed to comply with the
administrative provisions, the thirty-day time limit was not a juris-
dictional prerequisite. Sims further argued that HHS should have
been estopped from invoking his late complaint as a defense be-
cause HHS had processed his claims for five years without raising
such a defense. 6' To support his estoppel argument, Sims relied
extensively on the Supreme Court's reasoning in Zipes.62 The Sev-
enth Circuit rejected Sims' use of Zipes and denied this claim on sov-
ereign immunity grounds,63 reasoning that the government could
57 See id. at 1144. 42 U.S.C. section 2000e-16(c) allows federal employees to file
discrimination suits against the federal government. In his complaint, Sims alleged sev-
eral specific instances where HHS had allegedly discriminated against him. See id. at
1144.
58 Id. The court stated, "It has been a rule of 42 U.S.C. section 2000e-16jurispru-
dence that exhaustion of administrative remedies is a prerequisite for bringing an action
in federal court." Id (citing Brown v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 832 (1976);
Gaballah v.Johnson, 629 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir. 1980).
Specifically, the district court held that Sims had failed to comply with administra-
tive prerequisites when he complained to the EEO counsellor on December 15, 1977 for
discriminatory acts that allegedly occurred in March and November of 1976. Sims
therefore fell outside 29 C.F.R. section 1613.214(a)(1)(i) which required Sims to com-
plain within thirty calendar days of when "[tihe complainant brought to the attention of
the Equal Opportunity Counsellor the matter causing him to believe he had been dis-
criminated against .. " 29 C.F.R. § 1613.214(a)(1)(i).
59 725 F.2d at 1145. Recall that 29 C.F.R. section 1613.214(a)(4) directs the EEOC
to extend the time limits if the complainant shows he was unaware of such limits or was
prevented from complying with them by circumstances beyond his control.
60 Id. The court stated: "We find section 1613.214(a)(4) inapplicable here. The
plaintiff failed to make any showing as is required by the first exceptional circumstance,
and HHS never reached a deliberate decision regarding possible grounds for an exten-
sion, as is clearly contemplated in the second exceptional circumstance." Id.
Presumably, if Sims had awaited completion of the agency action and the agency
had denied the applicability of one of the exceptions enumerated in 29 C.F.R.
§ 1613.214(a)(4), Sims could have appealed the agency's decision.
61 Id.
62 Id. Recall that Zipes held the Title VII time limit not jurisdictional but rather
subject to equitable estoppel. See supra text accompanying notes 40-45.
63 The court stated:
It is established that the United States, as sovereign, is immune from suit
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not be estopped 64 without a clear showing of affirmative govern-
mental misconduct. 65 The Seventh Circuit distinguished Zipes as in-
volving only private parties, finding that the significance of the
federal defendant in relation to the jurisdictional issue rendered
Zipes inapposite.66 Under this analysis, because Sims was a federal
employee, he had failed to overcome the presumption of sovereign
immunity to his untimely suit. Moreover, Sims failed to show affirm-
ative governmental misconduct-Sims' last resort in his effort to ob-
tain federal jurisdiction. 67
Sims stands for the proposition that, under the strict standard,
all Title VII filing time limits applicable in suits against the federal
government are jurisdictional prerequisites to suit in federal district
court. This is true for statutory time limits that the plaintiff missed
for reasons not rising to the level of affirmative governmental mis-
conduct and is also true for agency promulgated time limits missed
for equitable reasons not covered an exception provision.
Nevertheless, Sims leaves two important questions unanswered.
First, what must a plaintiff seeking to invoke the administrative ex-
ception provisions show in order to succeed? Wolfolk v. Rivera68 an-
swers this first question. Second, how might a plaintiff unable to fit
into one of the exception provisions establish affirmative govern-
mental misconduct such as to overcome sovereign immunity? This
is discussed in a later part of the note.69
In Wolfolk v. Rivera, the Seventh Circuit set forth the required
showing for a plaintiff who wishes to invoke 29 C.F.R. section
1613.214(a)(4)'s exception provisions. The plaintiff in Wolfolk, a
black federal employee, sued a federal agency alleging hiring dis-
crimination.70 Even though Wolfolk met GS-12 requirements, the
save as it consents to be sued ... and the terms of its consent to be sued
in any court define that court's jurisdiction to entertain the suit ...
Waivers of sovereign immunity are to be strictly construed... [and] valid
administrative rules legislative in nature have the "force and effect of
law."
725 F.2d at 1145 (citations omitted).
64 Id. at 1146 ("[E]ven if the time limitation here were not jurisdictional, the plain-
tiff would not be entitled to relief because of the long-standing presumption against
estopping the federal government from asserting its legal rights.").
65 Id. at 1146 ("There has been no showing that the government's conduct in the
case at bar was anything more serious than a mere oversight.").
66 Id. at 1145. The Sims court also noted that, although two other circuits had ex-
tended Zipes to suits under 42 U.S.C. section 2000e-16(c) (citing Milam v. United States
Postal Service, 674 F.2d 860 (11 th Cir. 1982) and Saltz v. Lehman, 672 F.2d 207 (D.C.
Cir. 1982)), neither decision had considered the significance of the federal defendant in
relation to the jurisdictional issue.
67 Id.
68 729 F.2d 1114 (7th Cir. 1984).
69 See infra text accompanying notes 139-55.
70 Wolfolk worked for the Minority Business Development Agency ("MBDA"). He
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agency hired Wolfolk on September 10, 1979 as a GS-9. 71 At this
time, Wolfolk failed to inquire why, despite his qualifications, the
agency hired him as a GS-9.72 On August 14, 1980-eleven months
later-Wolfolk received written notice of termination from the the
Minority Business Development Agency [MBDA]. On that same
day, Wolfolk also learned that the MBDA had hired less qualified
white GS-1 1 employees in Wolfolk's office who performed the same
job Wolfolk performed at the rank of GS-9. Finally, on the same
day, Wolfolk discovered that his office had been reporting him to
Washington as a GS- 11.73
On September 3, 1980-twenty days after he discovered the
discrimination, but eleven months after the agency had hired him -
Wolfolk filed his discrimination complaint.74 After exhausting his
administrative remedies and receiving his notice of right to file a
civil action, Wolfolk timely filed suit within thirty days in federal dis-
trict court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 2000e-16(c).' 5 The district
court dismissed Wolfolk's complaint concluding that Wolfolk had
failed to present his discrimination complaint to the MBDA's EEO
counsellor within thirty days of the date of the allegedly discrimina-
tory act-his hiring as a GS-9. 76 In reversing the district court, 7 7 the
Seventh Circuit noted that the complaint had properly alleged that
Wolfolk "lacked knowledge of facts which would have supported a
discrimination claim" because of "circumstances beyond his con-
trol." s7 8 Wolfolk, therefore, fit squarely within the regulation's ex-
ception provision. The Seventh Circuit remanded the case for a
determination of whether Wolfolk should have known of the hiring
had responded to an announcement of available MBDA positions at the grades of GS-9,
11, or 12, depending upon the applicant's experience. The GS system is the govern-
ment's system of employee seniority. Essentially, the higher the GS number, the more
senior the employee. 729 F.2d at 1114-17.
71 Id. at 1116.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id. Wolfolk filed his discrimination complaint with the Office of Civil Rights in
the U.S. Department of Commerce. He received final notification of his right to sue
from the EEOC on about May 9, 1981.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 1115.
77 Id. at 1117.
78 Id. The Court stated:
[29 C.F.R. § 1613.214(a)(4)] provides for exceptions to the thirty-day
limit in certain circumstances ....
'The agency shall extend the time limits in this section: (i) When the
complainant shows that he was not notified of the time limits and was not
otherwise aware of them, or that he was prevented by circumstances be-
yond his control from submitting the matter within the time limits; or (ii)
for other reasons considered sufficient by the agency.'
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discrimination prior to August 14, 1980, the date he first learned his
agency reported him at a level of GS- 11.79
In deciding whether Wolfolk was prevented "by circumstances
beyond his control" from discovering discriminatory facts, the Sev-
enth Circuit expressly rejected a subjective test and instead in-
structed the district court to apply a reasonableness standard.8 0
The court reasoned:
A person is "prevented by circumstances beyond his control"
from submitting a discrimination charge until the time when
"facts that would support a charge of discrimination under Title
VII were apparent or should have been apparent to a person with
a reasonably prudent regard for his rights similarly situated to the
plaintiff."81
The Seventh Circuit went on to explain that "[w]hen the point in
time has been reached, a person must submit the matter to the
agency's EEO counselor within thirty days in order to take advan-
tage of the exception at issue here."' 82 The court adopted this stan-
dard "because it [struck] an appropriate balance between fairness to
the claimant and the importance of beginning the administrative
process of investigation and conciliation in a timely manner." 83
Although the Fifth Circuit originally had set forth this test in
the context of a Title VII action between private parties, 84 the Sev-
enth Circuit in Wolfolk adopted it as consistent with the broad lan-
guage of the regulation as applied to a federal plaintiff.85 Wolfolk
also suggested that the ideal case for application of the regulation's
exception provision was a case where, as in the instant case, the em-
ployer had sole access to the facts concerning the discrimination.86
In distinguishing Wolfolk and Sims, the Seventh Circuit noted
that Sims, unlike Wolfolk, had failed to show applicability of the
regulation's exception provisions. Therefore, sovereign immunity
rendered the regulatory thirty-day time limit a jurisdictional prereq-
uisite and time barred Sims' claim. 87 In Wolfolk, the Seventh Circuit
justified its use of a private Title VII case to adjudicate Wolfolk's
claim against a federal defendant despite sovereign immunity be-
79 Id. at 1117, 1120.
80 Id. at 1117.
81 Id. at 1117 (quoting Reeb v. Economic Opportunity of Atlanta, Inc., 516 F.2d
924, 931 (5th Cir. 1975)).
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 See Reeb v. Economic Opportunity of Atlanta, Inc., 516 F.2d 924, 931 (5th Cir.
1975).
85 729 F.2d at 1118 ("[E]quitable considerations require application of the excep-
tion found in the regulation .").
86 Id.
87 Id. at 1119.
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cause, the federal regualtion's exception ... is similar in scope to
the tolling principles applicable in private Title VII actions."' 8 Nev-
ertheless, the Seventh Circuit nowhere explains in which cases the
regulatory exception provisions were meant to be similar in scope to
equitable principles in private Title VII actions and where they were
meant to differ in scope. As a practical matter, given the Wolfolk test,
it is difficult to imagine a case where equitable principles would ap-
ply but where the regulatory exception provisions would not. Nev-
ertheless, the Wolfolk court noted that its holding did not eradicate
the differences between private and federal Title VII actions be-
cause federal employees were limited to the enumerated exceptions
while private employees had a potentially wider range of equitable
exceptions.8 9
In summary, the strict standard considers all Title VII time lim-
its in actions against a federal plaintiff to be jurisdictional. A plain-
tiff who misses such a time limit may only sue in federal court under
one of two circumstances: first, to toll 42 U.S.C. section 2000e-
16(c)'s statutory thirty-day limit, the employee must show affirma-
tive governmental misconduct; second, to toll an EEOC promul-
gated time limit, the employee must show that his behavior was
consistent with that of a person with a reasonably prudent regard
for his rights similarly situated to the plaintiff.90
3. The Intermediate Standard
Courts that apply the intermediate standard equitably toll or
waive Title VII time limits to gain jurisdiction over untimely Title
VII cases up to and including the time when the complaint leaves
the allegedly offending agency. 9' After the first interagency filing,
however, these courts consider time limits to be jurisdictional pre-
requisites to suit.92 Cooper v. Bell 9 3 illustrates the Ninth Circuit's ap-
88 Id.
89 Id. As will be shown infra text accompanying notes 134-38, the intermediate stan-
dard obviates the need for such fine distinctions.
90 See infra text accompanying notes 139-55.
91 In the words of one Court: "All of the Ninth Circuit cases that have referred to
Title VII filing periods as 'jurisdictional' have involved the [time limit for filing in federal
district court]." Cooper v. Bell, 628 F.2d 1208, 1214 n.10 (9th Cir. 1980). See also Scott
v. St. Paul Postal Serv., 720 F.2d 524, 525 (8th Cir. 1983) (per curiam), cert. denied, 465
U.S. 1083 (1984) (federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because of untimely
complaint); Rice v. Hamilton Air Force Base Commissary, 720 F.2d 1082, 1084 (9th Cir.
1983) (holding that plaintiff's filing of a request for appointment of counsel along with a
right-to-sue letter could be deemed filing of a civil action within the thirty-day jurisdic-
tional period); Mahroom v. Hook, 563 F.2d 1369, 1374 (9th Cir. 1977) (thirty-day limit
for filing in district court is jurisdictional but does not begin to run until plaintiff re-
ceives right-to-sue letter.).
92 See cases cited supra note 91.
93 628 F.2d 1208 (9th Cir. 1980).
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plication of the intermediate standard to a federal Title VII claim.
In Cooper, the plaintiff mailed a letter of resignation to his super-
visor at a federal agency after having complained of harassment.
One year later, in his federal district court action, Cooper argued
that the court should construe his letter of resignation as a com-
plaint. 94 Cooper argued that the court should therefore find that he
had filed his complaint with the agency's EEO Counselor within the
thirty-day time limit.95 The district court ruled that the letter of res-
ignation did not satisfy the filing requirement. 96 The Ninth Circuit
affirmed, stating that the filing of a complaint in district court after
the EEOC rejects the claim is a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit.
97
However, the court went on to compare the first intra-agency filing
time limit to a statute of limitations and therefore subject to equit-
able tolling.98
III
EVALUATION OF THE DIFFERENT APPROACHES
A. Statutory History of the 1972 Amendments
To evaluate the various standards, one must first examine the
statutory history of the 1972 amendments to Title VII to see if it
sheds any light on the extent to which Congress intended to waive
the federal government's immunity in Title VII. Although the statu-
tory history reveals congressional intent to extend to federal Title
VII plaintiffs many of the same remedies that their civilian counter-
parts enjoy, the statutory history fails expressly to import the total
equitable package that civilian employees enjoy.
Congress's Report on the 1972 amendments stated that Con-
gress intended the amendments to extend the same protection to
federal employees that civilian employees enjoyed.99 The House
Report explicitly stated, "there can exist no justification for any-
thing but a vigorous effort to accord Federal employees the same
rights and impartial treatment which the law seeks to afford employ-
94 Id. at 1210.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 1213 (citing Mahroom v. Hook, 563 F.2d 1369, 1374 (9th Cir. 1977)).
98 Id. at 1212-13.
99- See H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 25, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEws 2137, 2158. The House Report cited President Nixon's Memorandum
Accompanying Exec. Order No. 11,478, 3 C.F.R. 803 (1966-1970), reprinted in Presi-
dent's Memorandum to Heads of Departments and Agencies, 5 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
Doc. 1098 (Aug. 8, 1969), in which President Nixon stated that "discrimination of any




ees in the private sector."' 00 Congress recognized that the pre-
1972 complaint process impeded federal employment discrimina-
tion actions 01 because complainants hesitated to present their com-
plaints, fearing their complaints would only antagonize already
hostile supervisors and impair their advancement hopes. 10 2
The milieu prior to the first interagency filing justifies this con-
cern. All early filing procedures occur within the agency alleged to
have committed the discriminatory act.' 03 The plaintiff's superiors
have the opportunity to mislead or coerce the plaintiff into missing
the thirty-day filing deadline. 10 4 Absent individual self-restraint,
there are few controls that can prevent this coercive activity. 105
Although section 1613.214(a)(4) provides exceptions for plaintiffs
who fail to file timely complaints, it is easy to imagine a hypothetical
plaintiff who, through threats or coercion, is prevented from timely
filing. Similarly, it is easy to imagine a plaintiff who, though aware
of the discriminatory act, is unaware that it is discriminatory. More-
over, lacking a clear definition of governmental misconduct suffi-
cient to overcome the presumption of sovereign immunity, such
plaintiffs are probably without a remedy.
Congress intended the amendment to create arms-length deal-
100 H.R. REP. No. 238, supra note 99, at 25.
101 "The [grievance] system, which permit[ted] the Civil Service Commission to sit
in judgment of its own practices and procedures which themselves may raise questions
of systemic discrimination, creates a built in conflict of interests." Id. at 2159. See also
supra text accompanying note 5.
102 Id
103 See supra text accompanying notes 15-27.
104 Indeed, the current regulations implicitly recognize the potential for coercion:
"The Equal Employment Opportunity Counselor shall be free from restraint, interfer-
ence, coercion, discrimination, or reprisal in connection with the performance of his
duties under this section." 29 C.F.R. § 1613.213(d). The regulations continue:
The Counsellor shall not attempt in any way to restrain the aggrieved
person from filing a complaint... [and] shall not reveal the identity of an
aggrieved person who consulted the counsellor except when authorized
to do so by the aggrieved person, until the agency has accepted a com-
plaint of discrimination from that person.
29 C.F.R. § 1613.213(a)
Denial of equitable principles to a plaintiff at this point could even rise to the level
of a due process deprivation. The risk to the plaintiff is high and the probable value of
additional procedure at this point is similarly high. Cf Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319, 335 (1976) (three distinct factors determine if additional procedure is warranted:
(i) affected private interest; (ii) risk of erroneous deprivation through procedures used
and the likelihood that additional procedures will provide additional safeguards; (iii)
public/governmental interests); Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1267,
1279 (1975) (in a rough ordering of priorities in the elements of a fair hearing, an unbi-
ased tribunal is number one).
105 See W. GELLHORN, C. BYSE, P. STRAuss, T. RAKOFF & R. SCHOTLAND, ADMINISTRA-
TIVE LAW, CASES AND COMMENTS (1987) ("self control, reinforced by professional atti-
tudes within the public service . . . must not be overlooked, for without it, external
controls would be of small moment").
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ing in the complaint procedures to encourage employees to protect
their employment rights. 10 6 The drafters of the 1972 amendments
sought to minimize the risks of coercion within the offending
agency: "The provisions adopted by the committee will enable the
Commission to grant full relief to aggrieved [federal] employees....
Aggrieved employees ... will also have the full rights available in
the courts as are granted to individuals in the private sector under
Title VII." °107 A system where the courts may equitably extend time
limits applicable early in the agency proceedings advances this goal
by reducing the effectiveness of coercion.108 Nevertheless, once the
complaint leaves the allegedly discriminatory agency, claims of a
lack of arms-length dealing between the offending agency and the
aggrieved federal plaintiff lose much of their persuasiveness. After
this first interagency filing, congressional concerns with coersion
within the workplace should disappear. At this point, it would be
perfectly reasonable for courts to assume that Congress was aware
that common law notions of sovereign immunity would prevent ap-
plication of equitable principles against the government absent ex-
press congressional intent to the contrary. Thus, Congress must
have intended at least 42 U.S.C. section 2000e-16(c)'s time limit as a
jurisdictional barrier to suit in federal court. At this point, only a
showing of affirmative governmental misconduct should restore ju-
risdiction over an untimely Title VII claim against the federal
government. 09
Thus, although the statutory history of the 1972 amendments
supports those courts that accept jurisdiction over untimely Title
VII claims before the first interagency filing, the statutory history
fails to support any further expansion of equitable principles to
waive or toll the congressionally enacted statutory time limit. The
1972 amendments have no exception provision analogous to those
contained in 29 C.F.R. section 1613.214(a)(4) that might support
equitable estoppel or waiver of Title VII's statutory time limit. 10
Courts must therefore view the statute's thirty-day time limit for fil-
ing in federal district court as a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit.Il
This is consistent with congressional intent. After the EEOC sends
the plaintiff a right-to-sue letter, less risk of coercion exists from the
106 See supra text accompanying notes 4-8.
107 See S. REP. No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1971).
108 Cf Cooper v. Bell, 628 F.2d 1208, 1213 n.9 (9th Cir. 1980) ("[The reasons for
equitable tolling at the second stage of the process may be less compelling than at the
first stage, because by then the employee should have received counselling about how to
proceed with his charge. Circumstances might, nonetheless, warrant equitable treat-
ment in a given case.").
109 See infra text accompanying note 139.
110 See supra text accompanying note 23.
1 11 See supra text accompanying notes 10-13.
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offending agency. At this point, the plaintiff has received an unbi-
ased adjudication of his claim, and absent governmental miscon-




A. The Liberal Standard
Courts that apply the liberal standard accept jurisdiction over
any untimely Title VII claims upon a sufficient equitable showing,
regardless of which time limit the plaintiff has missed 1 2 and allow
the plaintiff to estop the government from raising the defense of
failure to comply with the Title VII time limits." 3 The statutory
history of the 1972 Amendments supports this approach with re-
spect to time limits applicable before the first interagency filing. 11
4
Nevertheless, these courts mis-construe Zipes in applying it to ex-
tend time limits applicable after the first interagency filing, espe-
cially the statutory thirty-day limit for filing suit in federal district
court.
Zipes equitably altered both agency promulgated and statutory
time limits in Title VII actions between private parties. When the
federal government is the defendant, however, sovereign immunity
changes the analysis. 115 After the first interagency filing, the possi-
bility of coercion within the offending agency which concerned Con-
gress no longer exists; the statutory history of the 1972 amend-
ments fails to justify a court assuming jurisdiction over an untimely
Title VII claim at this point."16 The liberal standard thus errs in
allowing courts to use these doctrines to create jurisdiction after the
first interagency filing.
B. The Strict Standard
Under the strict standard, compliance with Tide VII time limits
is ajurisdictional prerequisite to suit in federal district court. 71 7 Ab-
sent affirmative governmental misconduct, or a showing that one of
the agency promulgated exceptions applies, courts applying the
strict standard refuse to toll either statutory or agency-promulgated
time limits. 118
112 See supra note 36 and cases cited supra note 38.
113 See supra text accompanying notes 38-46.
114 See supra text accompanying notes 99-111.
115 See supra text accompanying notes 10-13.
116 See supra text accompanying notes 99-111.
117 See supra text accompanying notes 47-91.
118 Id.
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The Seventh Circuit correctly rejects Zipes to justify equitable
tolling or waiver of both agency and statutory time limits for three
reasons. First, courts must strictly construe the waiver statute
under general common law principles of interpretation." t9 Because
the statute does not provide for equitable tolling of the thirty-day
filing limit Seventh Circuit courts refuse jurisdiction over untimely
Title VII cases where the plaintiff has missed the statutory thirty-day
limit. Second, the Seventh Circuit holds that valid administrative
rules have the force and effect of law120 and thus define the terms of
the sovereign's consent to suit 12 1 such that the courts must construe
them strictly.' 22 Third, even if the time limits are not jurisdictional,
the Seventh Circuit will not estop the government as a general prin-
ciple of common law. 123
The strict standard approach properly refuses jurisdiction over
cases where the plaintiff has missed 42 U.S.C. section 2000e-16(c)'s
statutory time limit. Courts must construe waivers of sovereign im-
munity strictly as a general principle of common law. 124 The statu-
tory history of the 1972 amendments fails to clearly express
congressional intent to grant courts the power to waive the statute's
time limit 125 Therefore, as a matter of statutory construction,
courts must refuse to apply principles of equitable estoppel and
waiver to the statute's thirty-day filing requirement.
Presumably, however, the strict standard would refuse jurisdic-
tion over certain untimely Title VII claims against the federal gov-
ernment where equitable jurisdiction would otherwise exist for a
civilian defendant.' 26 This approach fails to recognize Congress'
express concern with intra-agency coercion and too rigidly attempts
to shoehorn generally applicable equitable principles into the two
regulatory exception provisions. 127 Equitable tolling at the initial
119 Sims v. Heckler, 725 F.2d 1143, 1145 (7th Cir. 1984).
120 Id. at 1146 (quoting Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 295 (1979)); United
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 695 (1974).
121 725 F.2d at 1146.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 See supra text accompanying notes 10-13.
125 See supra text accompanying notes 99-111.
126 See supra text accompanying note 89.
127 See supra text accompanying notes 99-111. Indeed, unless the Seventh Circuit is
surreptitiously importing equitable principles into the regulation's exception provi-
sions-which it claims it is not, see supra text accompanying note 89-it is difficult to
imagine why circumstances should per se remain out of the plaintiff's control until facts
that would support a charge of discrimination under Title VII were apparent or should
have been apparent to a person with a reasonably prudent regard for his rights-the
Wolfolk test. For example, a plaintiff who, upon pain of discharge, fails to submit a com-
plaint against a hostile supervisor would fail the Wolfolk test because the plaintiff would
be aware of the discriminatory event. Apparently, so long as this did not rise to the level
of affirmative governmental misconduct, a civilian plaintiff who suffered this injustice
216 [Vol. 74:199
EQUITABLE TOLLING
stages of the complaint process is consistent with congressional in-
tent and the regulatory scheme. 128 Congress did not premise fed-
eral court jurisdiction upon complaint to the EEO Counselor within
thirty days. Rather, Congress simply required the plaintiff to ex-
haust all administrative remedies 129 and empowered federal agen-
cies to promulgate regulations to implement Title VII's remedies.130
Moreover, the EEOC did not intend to promulgate rigid jurisdic-
tional requirements.' 3 ' A plaintiff denied equitable jurisdiction for
lack of timliness while the complaint was still within the offending
agency would be no better off today than under the pre-1972-
amendments regime where the Civil Service Commission carried
out the government's employment discrimination program.' 32 The
strict standard neither sufficiently considers Congress' remedial
purpose nor the numerous equitable considerations present
through the first interagency filing that the regulation's exception
provision might rectify. 133
C. The Intermediate Standard
Both the statutory history of the 1972 amendments and the
common law principles of sovereign immunity support the interme-
diate standard. Moreover, by distinguishing action occurring within
the allegedly discriminatory agency from action occurring outside of
such agency, the intermediate standard obviates the need for fine
distinctions required by the strict standard and conforms perfectly
to Congress' stated purpose. Courts that apply the intermediate
standard treat time limits up to and including the first interagency
time limit like statutes of limitations 34 subject to equitable tolling
or waiver. 135 As the plaintiff proceeds in the complaint process,
however, these courts require him to make an increasingly greater
equitable showing before they will toll a Title VII time limit.'3 6 Fi-
nally, these courts treat the statutory time limit for filing in federal
could equitably access a Seventh Circuit court while a federal plaintiff could not. This
seems contrary to the statute's purpose in removing enforcement power from the Civil
Service Commission and vesting it in the EEOC.
128 See supra text accompanying notes 99-111.
129 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c).
130 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(b).
131 Cooper v. Bell, 628 F.2d 1208, 1213 (9th Cir. 1980) ("The regulations them-
selves ... indicate that the [agency] did not intend the first filing period as a rigid juris-
dictional requirement" and that equitable tolling at the initial stage of the process is
consonant with the regulatory scheme.).
132 See supra text accompanying notes 1-5.
133 Again, the legislative history of the 1972 amendments implicitly addresses both
of these considerations. See supra text accompanying notes 99-121.
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district court as jurisdictional and therefore not subject to equitable
waiver or tolling. 1 7 Thus the intermediate approach is the only ap-
proach consistent both with sovereign immunity and Congress' in-




Even if we assume that a plaintiff who misses one of the statu-
tory time limits relinquishes federal court jurisdiction, the Supreme
Court has suggested that a plaintiff who can show affirmative gov-
ernmental misconduct will not be foreclosed from federal court ju-
risdiction. 139 Traditionally, courts have refused to estop the
government no matter how compelling the circumstances. 40 The
Court has yet to define the standard for governmental misconduct
sufficient to invoke estoppel against the government,' 4 ' but the
Tenth Circuit in Martinez v. Orr 142 did provide a standard for evalu-
ating governmental misconduct.
In Martinez, the plaintiff brought to the EEOC a discrimination
action against the Air Force. When EEOC negotiations failed, the
EEOC sent Martinez his right-to-sue letter.143 The right-to-sue let-
ter gave Martinez the option either to sue in district court within the
statutory thirty days or to request reconsideration of the EEOC's
decision. 14 4 Martinez chose the latter and after ten months the
EEOC denied reconsideration. This denial came nine months after
'37 Id.
138 See supra text accompanying notes 99-121.
139 See, e.g., Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Hibi, 414 U.S. 5, 8 (1973) (sug-
gesting that affirmative misconduct might provide a ground for estopping the federal
government from raising a defense); Montana v. Kennedy, 366 U.S. 308, 314-15 (1961)
(suggesting that governmental misconduct provides for estoppel in appropriate cases);
Sims v. Heckler, 725 F.2d 1143, 1146 (7th Cir. 1984) (citing Portmann v. United States,
674 F.2d 1155, 1167 (7th Cir. 1982)); Note, Schweiker v. Hansen: Equitable EstoppelAgainst
the Government, supra note 13, at 627 (proposing a standard for evaluating affirmative
misconduct).
140 See, e.g., Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. 785, 788 (1981) (courts consistently have
refused to estop the government where an eligible applicant lost benefits because of
erroneous replies to oral inquiries); Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380,
385 (1947) (the terms and conditions for creating liability on the part of the government
define the parameters of sovereign immunity, regardless of reliance on governmental
agent's misstatement); Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389, 409
(1917) ("It is enough to say that the United States is neither bound nor estopped by acts
of its officers or agents in entering into an arrangement or agreement to do or cause to
be done what the law does not sanction or permit."). See also Note, Schweiker v. Hansen:
Equitable Estoppel Against the Government, supra note 13, at nn.33 & 36.
141 See generally, Note, Equitable Estoppel Against the Government, supra note 13, at 552
(seeking to develop uniform principles of government estoppel).
142 738 F.2d 1107 (10th Cir. 1984).




the thirty-day federal time limit expired.145 Martinez next filed suit
in district court but the court dismissed his claim as untimely 146 be-
cause, contrary to what Martinez had been told, the request for re-
consideration had not tolled the thirty-day limit.147 On appeal,
Martinez argued that, even if the thirty-day time limit presented a
jurisdictional bar, equitable considerations required the court to toll
the time limit. The Tenth Circuit agreed. 148 The court held that
mailing the right-to-sue letter together with the option for reconsid-
eration constituted " 'active deception' sufficient to invoke the pow-
ers of equity."' 149 On this basis Martinez, could estop the
government from raising the lack-of-timeliness defense, even as to
the statutory thirty-day limit.' 50
Although the court never referred directly to affirmative mis-
conduct, "'active deception' sufficient to invoke the powers of eq-
uity" seems to embody the concept of affirmative misconduct.' 51
The court also explained that equitable tolling might be appropriate
where a past employer, the state, the federal agency, or the courts
"lulled" the plaintiff into inaction.' 52 Martinez implicitly balanced
the governmental interest in denying the plaintiff equitable estoppel
against the resultant harm to the plaintiffi.
53
Courts should evaluate governmental misconduct under the
following procedure. First, courts must apply the threshold inquiry
of whether the governmental interest outweighs the plaintiff's inter-
ests. If the balance does not favor the government, the plaintiff then
has the opportunity to show that governmental agents engaged in





149 Id. at 1110 (citations omitted).
150 Id. at 1111. The court stated:
Absent an explicit indication that the right to sue permanently expires
after thirty days notwithstanding the pendency of a reconsideration re-
quest, we do not think it unreasonable for a pro se recipient of the notice
to request EEOC reconsideration on the assumption that if the request
were denied, a new thirty day period... would arise.
Id
151 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
152 738 F.2d at 1110.
153 Id at 1112. ("This case does not involve an unreasonable or unnecessary delay.
Nor does it constitute an attempt to revive a long stale claim or otherwise circumvent the
statutory period at issue.") This language suggests that the court, at least implicitly,
considered the government's interest in repose as one of the factors to be balanced
against the plaintiff's need for just dispute resolution. Recall that the Seventh Circuit
applied a similar balancing approach when determining whether or not to apply the 29
C.F.R. § 1613.214 exceptions. See supra text accompanying note 83. Cf. Matthews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
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active deception sufficient to invoke the powers of equity.1 54 Such
active deception might consist of an institutionalized affirmative
act-such as in Martinez-that misleads or lulls the plaintiff into inac-
tion. 155 Only when the plaintiff satisfies this test should a court es-
top the government from asserting jurisdictional time limitations in
defense to a Title VII claim. This test not only satisfies the common
law presumption strictly construing waivers of sovereign immunity
absent a showing of affirmative misconduct, it also implements Con-
gress' broad remedial purpose.
CONCLUSION
In 1972, Congress amended the 1964 Civil Rights Act, in part
to provide federal employees with a private cause of action in cases
of federal employment discrimination. As such, Congress expressly
waived its sovereign immunity from suit. The common law
presumes that such waivers of sovereign immunity must be strictly
construed. Nevertheless, the 1972 Amendments failed to provide
expressly for recognition of the equitable doctrines of estoppel, toll-
ing, or waiver in Title VII actions against the federal government.
Thus, the extent to which Congress waived the government's immu-
nity, and consequently the extent to which federal courts may apply
equitable principles to assume jurisdiction over untimely Title VII
claims, remains unclear. The statutory history of the 1972 Amend-
ments provides some insight, but tension still exists between the
statute's express remedial purpose and the lack of express provision
for courts to use equity to assume jurisdiction over untimely but
compelling cases.
This note suggests an analytical framework for courts to use to
determine whether to assume subject matter jurisdiction over Title
VII claims whose prerequisites have not strictly been met. The
court must determine whether the plaintiff missed a time limit while
his complaint was still within the allegedly discriminatory agency. If
so, upon sufficient equitable showing, courts should utilize equit-
able principles to assume jurisdiction over otherwise untimely Title
VII claims against the United States. A plaintiff has made a suffi-
ciently equitable showing if the plaintiff acted as a person similarly
154 Absent more fact patterns like that presented in Martinez, this note does not re-
solve the question of what facts are sufficient to invoke the powers of equity.
155 This requires the plaintiff not only to show active deception such as to mislead a
plaintiff with a fairly acute sense of his Title VII rights, but also to show that he was
actually misled. Active deception need not be malicious. It need only be some institu-
tionalized affirmative act-such as mailing the right to sue letter with a request for con-
sideration-that misleads a plaintiff. The fact that the federal Title VII plaintiff is, by
this time, quite familiar with his Title VII remedies suggests that the active deception
will have to be quite misleading.
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situated to the plaintiff with a reasonably prudent regard for his
rights. If the plaintiff makes such a showing, the court should toll or
waive the time limit, estop the government from asserting non-com-
pliance with the time requirements as a defense, and assume juris-
diction over the case.
Once the complaint leaves the allegedly offending agency, and
especially after the plaintiff receives the right-to-sue letter, courts
should refuse jurisdiction over untimely Title VII claims unless the
plaintiff shows that the government engaged in affirmative miscon-
duct. Such a plaintiff must show that, despite his diligence in pursu-
ing relief, an institutionalized procedure exists that results in active
deception sufficient to invoke the powers of equity that in fact mis-
led or lulled the plaintiff into inaction.
Jack E. Fernandez
